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1 Introduction 
A firm in multidivisional form (an M-form firm, in short) is a corporation in 
which several divisions (or profit centers) are operated semi-autonomously. 
The significance of M-form firms in the present-day economy has increasingly 
been recognized since the publication of Chandler's (1962) seminal study of 
their historical development. 
Each division in an M-form firm is, to a significant extent, an indepen- 
dent decision-maker.2 As decision-units of the same corporation, however, 
these divisions talk to each other and coordinate their production activities. 
Total profit will then be distributed to the divisions. While coordination of 
product ion activities better serves interests of the divisions, there arise con- 
flicts when it comes to the imputation of profit. The divisions therefore agree 
on a specific plan for coordinated activities/imputation, so that no coalition 
of divisions can improve upon it by its own effort, that is, the divisions are 
settled a t  a self-enforcing agreement. This is precisely the scenario that the 
descriptive strategic cooperative game theory analyzes. Recently, Radner 
(1992) (1) formulated the internal organization of an M-form firm as a static 
model of a profit-center game, (2) viewed the core of the game (a central de- 
scriptive cooperative solution concept) as the self-enforcing agreements, and 
(3) studied its properties for several interesting cases. 
The history of strategic cooperative game theory, in particular the his- 
tory of cooperative extensions of noncooperative games, is quite long by now. 
Here, it is only mentioned that, following the earlier work on the coopera- 
tive extensions of the Bayesian game, Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) (1) 
addressed the issue of whether or not player j in coalition S ,  in pursuit of 
his self-interest, decides to  pass on his private information to  the other mem- 
bers of S, and if he does, which part of his private information he decides 
to  pass on, (2) proposed a new version of the Bayesian incentive compatible 
strong equilibrium concept which answers this issue endogenously, and (3) 
established generic existence theorems for this equilibrium. 
The present paper addresses information processing in an M-form firm. 
Until recent years, the economics of information has focused on noncoop- 
erative behavior, in particular the Stackelberg-type relationship between a 
2 0 f  course, some decisions are typically made by the firm's central management, e.g., 
levels and types of capital expenditures, location, and even total numbers of employees. 
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single mechanism-designer and several agents. This setup is inappropriate 
for analysis of information processing in an M-form firm, because there is no 
such relationship among the divisions. Indeed, all divisions participate in the 
design of a corporate mechanism, and then execute their tasks in accordance 
with the agreed upon mechanism. 
Roughly stated, the present paper is built upon the works of Radner 
(1992) and Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994). The information studied here is 
about types of the divisions; the precise content of a type will be beriefly 
described in the third paragraph below, and will be  spelled out in detail in 
paragraphs four through seven of Section 2. In the ex ante stage, divisions 
in an M-form firm agree on a mechanism (called henceforth a plan), which 
specifies production of commodities and profit imputation contingent upon 
each type-profile. The plan is executed in the subsequent two periods of 
the interim stage. In the first interim period, each division has its private 
information on its true type, but by making specific supply/demand decisions 
about some commodities, it reveals to  the other divisions that one of its types 
a t  which this specific supply/demand should be made according to  the plan 
must be true. A part of the private information is endogenously pooled this 
way. Based upon the pooled information (in addition to the other part of 
information that  still remains private), the divisions make supply/demand 
decisions about the other commodities and claim their profit imputation in 
the second interim period. To enforce divisions' truthful actions in each 
period, only Bayesian incentive-compatible plans are considered during the 
planning period of the ex ante stage. The headquarters of the firm may be 
considered one of the divisions that actively participate in coalitional design 
of a plan and subsequent execution of the agreed upon plan. It is postulated 
that the headquarters also plays the role of a risk-neutral insurer; even with 
this postulate, the divisions' behavior and hence the descriptive solution of 
the game reflect the intricate problem of information processing - for a more 
detailed discussion, see the paragraph that follows statement of Postulate 
2.4. A core plan is defined as a Bayesian incentive-compatible plan of the 
grand coalition of divisions, upon which no coalition can improve using its 
Bayesian incentive-compatible plan. It is the  Bayesian incentive-compatible 
strong equilibrium specialized to the present context. Due to  the richness 
of the structure of the profit-center game, exact existence theorems can be 
established here, rather than merely generic existence theorems. 
Actually, a stronger notion of core is considered here. A core plan is called 
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ful l - information revealing if each division fully reveals its private information 
in the first period. Conditions for the existence of a full-information revealing 
core plan are established in the present paper. 
One of the key ingredients in Radner' (1992) formulation of an M-form 
firm, which is also replicated in the present paper, is the distinction of market  
commodi t ies  and nonmarke t  commodit ies;  while a commodity in the former 
category has a price established in the market outside the firm, a commodity 
in the  latter category has no price and is used only internally. An intermediate 
nonmarke t  commodity  is a commodity, not available in the market, which is 
supplied &s an output by a division of the firm and is demanded as an input 
by another division. A central resource allocation problem in an M-form firm 
then arises: A nonmarket commodity produced or initially held by a division 
(say, division i)  is transferred to  another division (say, division j ) ,  and the 
two divisions have to come up with a mutually agreeabIe leveI of payment 
that j has to  make to i in return for the use of the commodity. The core 
profit imputation concept addresses this problem. 
Just as a division can produce an intermediate nonmarket commodity 
while some others cannot, production sets can differ among the divisions. 
This typically presupposes the asset specificity for each division, as empha- 
sized with empirical evidence by Williamson (1975) and Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian (1978): Some assets are so specialized that the benefit from their use 
in the firm overweighs their salvage value in the  market. Klein, et al. (1978) 
call the difference between the benefit and the salvage value the quasi  rent 
value. When the quasi rent value is high, the firm does not bother to  sell the 
assets as a scrap, so these resources are classified as nonmarket commodi- 
ties. Williamson (1991) lists six kinds of asset specificity, but for simplicity 
of argument the present paper will focus on physical-asset specificity such as 
specialized plants designed for production of specific outputs and specialized 
dies required to produce an intermediate commodity, and the human-asse t  
specificity that arises in learning by doing of the human-resource holders. 
Differences in production sets reflects differences in specialization. The de- 
gree of specialization may well be private information of division i ,  and this 
fact actually motivates the present Bayesian formulation of the M-form firm 
in the following two ways: First, a feasible net output depends on a type- 
profile. Second, by interpreting the quantity of a nonmarket commodity a 
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[the actual physical quantity] x [its efficiency (degree of specialization)], 
the amount of a that division i initially holds depends on i's type. 
There are three existence results for a full-information revealing core plan 
in the present paper. For all results, nonmarket commodities that are sup- 
pliedldemanded in the first interim period play a crucial role. The first 
result is under the neoclassical convexity assumption on the production sets 
(Theorem 3.1). It is consistent with the presence of intermediate nonmarket 
commodities, so the transfer payment problem is fully answered. The second 
result is for a particular class of total production sets which satisfy increas- 
ing returns to scale (Theorem 4.2). Here, a stronger condition than Scarf's 
(1986) distributiveness is imposed on the total production set Y. Moreover, 
the market commodities are assumed to be  used only as inputs (so inter- 
mediate nonmarket commodities are excluded from the analysis). Roughly 
speaking, the set Y is required to satisfy: (1) increasing returns to scale with 
respect to any equiproportional increase in all the type-profile-contingent 
commodities; (2) strict convexity of the input-requirement sets (in the space 
of nonmarket input plans); and (3) strict convexity of the auxiliary concept of 
production possibility sets (in the space of market net output plans) defined 
in terms of the hypothetical, derivative concept of "cost function." A non- 
commodity resource of a division is a resource owned by or assigned to  that  
division, which is not for sale (so it  is not a market commodity), and which 
can not be transferred to another division (so it is not a nonmarket commod- 
ity); e.g., a plant of each division. It should be  pointed out that  conditions 
(1) and (3) together implicitly assume that each net output plan needs the 
associated adjustment of non-commodity resources and/or effort. In spite of 
the  inability to  analyze the role of intermediate nonmarket commodities in 
the  second result (Theorem 4.2), the transfer payment problem for exchange 
of initial nonmarket resources is explicitly solved by a core profit imputa- 
tion plan. The third result is for a particular structural relationship among 
the divisions (Theorem 5.2). Here, the divisions are divided into the suppli- 
ers and the customers. The suppliers produce and supply to the customers 
nonmarket intermediate commodities. The customers use these nonmarket 
intermediate commodities, produce market commodities and bring in profit 
to the firm. No assumption is made in Theorem 5.2 on returns to  scale. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-05 
A core plan is a descriptive solution concept; it describes the mechanism 
that the divisions determine endogenously. Its non-optimality property was 
studied in Ichiishi and Sertel (forthcoming, Example 4.4). Section 2 of the 
present paper reports very briefly the main conclusions of Ichiishi and Sertel 
(forthcoming, Example 4.4) on the non-optimality. 
The next section constructs the model of profit-center game with incom- 
plete information, and presents basic postulates and assumptions. While it  
contains a precise formal treatment of the model and key assumptions, every 
attempt is made to present verbally the economic motivations for the con- 
cepts and the economic meanings or justifications of the assumptions. Some 
concepts are straightforward to motivate, yet require much involved technical 
formulations for precision; in such cases a formal definition will be postponed 
until Section 6. In Section 3, an existence theorem is stated for the neoclas- 
sical case of convex technology. In Section 4, an existence theorem is stated 
for the case in which increasing returns to  scale prevail. In Section 5, an 
existence theorem is stated for the case in which a specific supplier-customer 
relationship holds among the divisions. Section 6 contains complete proofs 
of the theorems. 
2 A Multidivisional Firm with Incomplete 
Informat ion 
The transfer payment problem that arises in Chandler's (1962) firm in mul- 
tidivisional form was formulated by Radner (1992). This section extends 
Radner's model to the situation in which each division may have its private 
information. The divisions determine in the ex ante stage a mechanism that 
specifies their actions and rewards in the subsequent interim stages contin- 
gent upon the reported (that is, pretended) or inferred types. In the present 
context of an M-form firm, a mechanism will be called a plan. As an endoge- 
nously determined plan, a core plan is a descriptive solution concept. It  is 
not designed to fulfill any normative criterion. Indeed, some of the work of 
another paper will be cited later in the present section to clarify that  a core 
plan is not (in general) ex post Pareto optimal (see the second paragraph 
that follows the statement of Definition 2.5). 
The firm is divided into finitely many divisions. The goods, services, 
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and resources that are used, produced, bought or sold by the divisions are 
called commodities. The commodities are classified into two categories: those 
k, commodities, called market commodities, that are bought or sold by the 
divisions, and those k, commodities, called nonmarket commodities, that are 
owned or produced by the firm and used internally. Nonmarket commodities 
can be  multilaterally exchanged among the divisions. An important resource 
that is not considered a commodity here is the physical plant of each division; 
the present paper focuses on the situation in which plants are fixed for the 
division, thus are neither market commodities nor nonmarket commodities 
(divisions cannot sell them in the market nor can exchange them among 
themselves) .3 
Let I be the set of divisions. Let I<, be the set of market commodities, 
and let IC, be the set of nonmarket commodities. The number of elements 
in set IC,, (in set K,, resp.) is then k, (k,, resp.), The set of commodities 
is defined4 as K := IIT, U IC,. Let k := k, + k,, the number of elements in 
set IC. 
Division i's technology is embodied in its assets, human and physical; 
this is the phenomenon called the asset specificity. The know-how developed 
in the division represents the quality of its human resources, and is put into 
effect in production by installing specialized facilities. The  benefit to  the firm 
from internal use of these human resources and specialized facilities is much 
higher than their sale value in the market, so the firm makes every effort to 
keep them, that is, these assets are nonmarket commodities. A state of i7s 
technology is, therefore, identified with a state of i7s initially endowed non- 
market commodities. Division i's technology takes several possible states. 
These states are called here i7s possible types. At a certain stage of produc- 
tion, i's true type becomes i's private information; that is, division i knows 
its own type but not the  others7. 
To hold a patent, for example, is a particular way to  use know-how. 
However, patented know-how is already public information. In the present 
paper, initially patented know-how does not distinguish states (qualities) of 
human resources. It may distinguish states (specificities) of physical facilities; 
the point is whether or not the physical facilities are appropriately specified 
for use of the patented know-how. 
3See footnote 1 above. 
4The notation "a := b" means "a is equal to  6 by definition." 
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In the  present paper the quantity of a nonmarket human resource a is 
defined as 
[the actual physical quantity] x [its efficiency (degree of specialization)], 
so the amount of a that division i initially holds depends on i's type. By 
definition of embodied technology, the nonmarket non-human commodity 
bundle that  i initially holds depends on ils type. Thus, there is a 1-1 cor- 
respondence between i's type space and the range of its initially endowed 
nonrnarket commodity vector. 
Division i's state of technology, together with a condition on its non- 
commodity assets (such as i's plant), determines feasibility of input-output 
vectors in production. The feasibility is described by the production set 
concept (to be specified shortly). 
A subset S of I is called a coalition of divisions. If the members of 
coalition S fully pool their private information, they share the information 
structure generated by their private information. In reality, however, a mem- 
ber may not want to pass on to the others (a part of) its private information, 
and even if it does, the others may not take it  as a truthful revelation of 
its type. The present paper addresses how private information is processed 
through coalitional choice of actions. 
Formally, let Z be the family of all nonempty coalitions of I; Z := 2' \ (0). 
Let Ti be the set of possible types of division i, which is assumed to be finite. 
Coalition S's type-profile space is given as Ts := niEs Ti, S E 2. Set for 
simplicity, T := TI.  Division i's private information structure is then defined 
as the algebra '& on T generated by the cylinder-sets, {{ti} x TI\(;) ( ti E 
Ti} The information structure of S generated by the members' private 
information is Ts := V t E S 7 ; .  The present paper addresses which subalgebra 
of TS is endogenously determined through coalitional choice of actions. 
Each division i knows all the objective ex ante probabilities 71-j on Tj ,  
j E I. The divisions' types are assumed to  be statistically independent. 
Thus the probability ~ ( t )  of type profile is given by ~ ( t )  := niEI n;(t;). It is 
postulated5 that 71- >> 0. 
A net output plan of division i is a function y; : T -+ Rk, which assigns to 
each type-profile t a net output contingent upon t ,  y;(t) := (milt), n;(t)); the 
'For two vectors x  and x', x  2 a' means n ( t )  2 x i ( t )  for all t ,  x  > n' means [ x  2 xf  
and x  # x'], and a  >> n' means x ( t )  > n l ( t )  for all t .  
8 
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subvectors mi(t) ( E  Rkm) and ni(t) ( E  R k n )  correspond to the market and 
nonmarket commodities, respectively. The usual sign convention is adopted 
here, so a coordinate of y;(t) is positive or negative according to whether 
the corresponding commodity is a net output or a net input of division i. 
The production set Y; (C ~ ~ 1 ~ 1 )  is the set of all technologically feasible net 
output plans of i, where IT1 is the cardinality of T. Define Ys := Dies Y;, 
and ys := (yi);€--. Function y s  is a net output plan of coalition S. 
Two comments on the production sets are in order. First, to  take the 
individual production sets Y,  as given data, and derive the coalitional total 
production sets by Y(S) := CieSx presupposes that  there are no external 
economies or diseconomies. On the other hand, one may adopt a more gen- 
. eral approach in which coalitional total production sets Y(S), S E 2, are 
given data; in this case, external economies can be  formulated as Y(S) > 
CieS Y({i)). Although the main results of the present paper (Theorems 3.1, 
4.2 and 5.2) are established for the non-externality case, generalizations to 
the externality case turn out to be straightforward. (See Remarks 3.2 and 
4.4.) 
Second, a specific instance of a production set is given by Y,  = ntET x ( t ) ,  
x ( t )  c Rk. Here, Y;:(t) is a t-contingent production set of division i. In this 
case, given type-profile f ,  {mi(t))tGT\i. and ii;, the production possibility set 
for market commodities a t  f ,  
is determined only by ii;(o, and is independent of net outputs fj;(t)'s chosen 
at the other type-profiles t # f. The present general formulation, on the other 
hand, allows for the possibility that the production possibility set for market 
commodities a t  ? depends on the entire menu of nonmarket net outputs 
across all type-profiles, {iii(t)}tfT, as well as on {fh;(t)),;ci. The need for 
this general formulation arises if, for the production of net market output 
plan m,, an adjustment of specific effort and/or non-commodity resources 
is required in addition to the choice of a net nonmarket output plan n;, 
and different adjustments of effort/resources are required for different mi's. 
This dependence (that is, the dependence of the production possibility set 
for market commodities a t  each t on the entire nonmarket net output plan 
n;) turns out to be crucial for the existence result in the case of increasing 
returns to  scale (Theorem 4.2). (See Remarks 3.3, 4.5 and 5.3.) 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-05 
Given division i7s type ti E T', the vector ri(ti) (E  Rkn) of initial resources 
describes the quantities of nonmarket commodities that are assigned to  (or 
owned by) division i contingent upon t, before the production process. 
A net output will be sold in the market under price vector p ( E  Rkm).  
The profit6 that division i brings in to the firm by selling its net output 
of market commodities mi(t) is the inner product p - mi(t). In the present 
partial equilibrium analysis, the price vector p is exogenously given. It is 
postulated that p >> 0. 
In reality, however, there are likely very few M-form firms that are price- 
takers. In order to drop this perfect competition assumption on the markets, 
one may formally take each value pa to be equal to 1, a E K,, and re-interpret 
. the  a-component of vector mi(t) as the profit, rather than the quantity, that 
the  firm makes in the ath industry (so that p.m;(t) is i's profit). According to 
this interpretation, the market prices made by the firm are hidden behind the 
model, and the downward sloping demand for outputs and upward sloping 
supply of inputs are subsumed in the divisional production sets. Of course, 
this can give rise to production externalities if different divisions purchase the 
same inputs or sell the same outputs. The coalitional total-production-set 
approach (see Remarks 3.2, 4.4) takes into account of such externalities. It 
should be pointed out, however, that t o  examine assumptions on the output 
demand functions and the input supply functions within this re-interpreted 
framework is outside the scope of the present paper. 
D E F I N I T I O N  2.1 A profit-center game with incomplete information is a 
list of exogenously given data, V := ({Ti, ri)iEI, (K,  T ; ( - ) ) ; ~ ~ ,  p), of: 
Ti, set of possible types of division i; 
T;, ex ante probability on ir;; 
'L;, production set of division i; 
r; : Ti -+ R k n ,  resource function of division i; and 
p, price vector of the market commodities, 
such that T; >> 0 for all i E I, and p >> 0. 
Given a type-profile t E T, a profit imputation of coalition S is a vector 
xs(t) := ( ~ ; ( t ) ) ; , ~  whose i th coordinate is to  be interpreted as the accounting 
6The present definition of profit is different from the neoclassical definition of profit, 
in that  it need not reflect the cost of resources, such as capital, that  are not under the 
control of the divisions. 
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profit attributed to division i .  The incentive of division i is to  claim as high 
a profit as possible for each t .  A profit imputation plan of coalition S is a 
function x s  : T + R ~ ,  t H xS(t). 
The  ex ante stage is defined as the stage in which no division knows the 
true type of any division. The interim stage is defined as the stage in which 
each division in coalition S knows its own true type and possibly has some 
information about the true types of some other divisions in S. The ex post 
stage is the stage in which each division knows the true type-profile in T. 
Here is a rough outline of the scenario of how a production process in 
coalition 'S takes place (this paragraph and the next two paragraphs). Sup- 
pose that  the members of coalition S have agreed on a pair (xs, ys) of a profit 
imputation plan and a net output plan a t  the ex ante stage. A pair (xs, ys) 
will henceforth be called a plan. An agreement on a plan, once made, will 
remain binding throughout the production periods. The production process 
takes place for two periods of the interim stage: The first interim period 
is for the divisions' simultaneous decisions about initial investment, that is, 
about setting up their manufacturing processes. The second interim period 
is for subsequent decisions about actual manufacturing, that is, about choice 
of an input-output vector, and for imputation of the profit that  is made by 
sale/purchase of the market commodities. There are k1 commodities, market 
or nonmarket, whose supplyldemand constitutes the setup of a manufactur- 
ing process in the  first period. The other k2 commodities, also market or 
nonmarket, are supplied/demanded in the second period as outputs/inputs, 
k2 := k -  kl. 
At the beginning of the first period, Nature reveals t o  division i that its 
true type is &; this is i7s private information at that time. Based upon this 
information, division i chooses in the first period the kl-dimensional subvec- 
tor of an initial net investment according to the agreement. This subvector is 
observed by every member of the coalition, so assuming that  choices of these 
subvectors are made according to the true types &, i E S, every division 
knows by the end of the first period the realization of the event defined as 
the set of those type-profiles in Ts which give rise to  the  observed subvec- 
tors. In the second period, division i uses this new information (and again its 
knowledge about its true type ti) to  choose the k2-dimensional subvector of 
input-output and receive its profit imputation. In short, a feasible plan has 
to reflect the various pieces of information made available t o  each division 
during the production process (the information-pooling rule; see Postulate 
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2.2 below), in addition to the technological and resource constraints. 
Before the production process, that is, in the -ex ante stage, all feasible 
plans (xs, ys), S E 1, are negotiated about by the divisions. The preceding 
paragraph outlined that as a part of the feasibility constraint, these plans 
have to satisfy the information-pooling rule. Plans should also be designed 
carefully enough so that they guarantee their truthful execution (Bayesian in- 
centive compatibility; see Postulate 2.3 below). One may imagine the negoti- 
ation process as a succession of coalition formations, each coalition improving 
upon the plan of the preceding coalition. The Bayesian incentive compati- 
bility may be so stringent a condition that there may not be a feasible plan 
that satisfies it and at the same time encounters no LLblockingn coalition. To 
resolve this difficulty, the firm's headquarters is given the role of an insurer 
(see Postulate 2.4 below). Eventually, the grand coalition I is formed, and 
the divisions are settled at a feasible and Bayesian incentive-compatible plan 
(x;, y;) that no coalition can improve upon. The plan (x;, y;) is sustained 
throughout the rest of the negotiation period of the ex ante stage. It is this 
self-enforcing plan that is agreed upon in the firm. 
To start the precise description of the scenario, denote by Fs the set of 
all technologically attainable plans of a coalition S, that is, the set of all 
functions (xs, ys) : Ts --+ ~ ( ~ + ~ ) l ~ l  such that ys is technologically feasible, 
i.e., ys E Ys, and such that the total resource constraint is satisfied within 
Notice that while a plan is in general defined as a function of t ,  the tech- 
nological attainability imposes the condition that it be a function only of 
ts; this condition reflects the fact that the maximal information possibly 
available to each member of S is the algebra Is on T. Dependence of a 
plan only on ts is re-stated as its 7s-measurability as a function on T. In 
order to simplify notation, however, one may write (xs(t), ys(t)) instead of 
(xs(ts), ys(ts)) throughout this paper; no confusion arises. Notice also that 
negative imputation is a l l~wed .~  
Let IiTl be the index set for the kl commodities that are produced/used in 
the first period as an initial investment, and let I!* be the index set for the k2 
71n the main results of this paper (Theorems 3.1, 4.2 and 5.2), the existence of an 
equilibrium plan (x;, y;), called a core plan, for which V t : V i : xf ( t )  > 0 is asserted. 
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commodities that are produced/used in the second period as outputs/inputs. 
The family {IG, IC2) is a partition of K ,  possibly different from partition 
{Ii',, I(,). A net output plan y; may be written as 
where 
so the components of yl;(t) (of y2;(t), resp.) correspond to K1 (K2, resp.). 
Define yls :=: (yli)iEs, y2s := ( Y ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ~ .  By the information-pooling rule (to 
be precisely postulated shortly), yl; is actually a function only of t;, and y2; 
is a function only of t i  and the information pooled through yls. 
Suppose coalition S is to form, so the members consider a plan (xs, ys). 
The private information structure that division i holds at the beginning of 
the first period is 'I;, so yl; has to depend only upon ti (that is, it has to 
be ?;-measurable). Let A(ylj) be the algebra on T generated by function 
Y l j  : T + Rkl,  that is, the smallest algebra on T that contains the family of 
sets {(~lj)-~(V1j) I q1j € Rkl). Assuming that choices of yli(ti)'s are made 
according to the true types, the information structure ~ ~ , = ~ d ( y ~ ~ )  beco~nes 
a common knowledge in coalition S at the beginning of the second period. 
Define 
~ ( Y I S )  := Z V (vjCsd(yl j ) ) .  
The members can design y s  at the ex ante stage, so that each (xi, y2;) is 
t(yls)-measurable. Thus, one can make the following postulate: 
POSTULATE 2.2 (Information-Pooling Rule)  The members of coali- 
tion S can design only those plans (xs, ys) such that for each i E S it follows 
that 
(i) division i7s plan for the first interim period is a function only of its type, 
i.e., yl; is ?;-measurable, 
(ii) division i's plan for the second interim period is a function only of its 
type and the pooled information of its own coalition, i.e., (z;, y2;) is 'I;(yls)- 
measurable. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-05 
In the light of the information-pooling rule, define F& to be the set of 
allowable plans for S, i.e., 
In order for the present information-pooling rule to work, the members 
of coalition S need to have the common knowledge that each division has 
the incentive to make a choice in the first period according to its true type. 
After all, the agreement will not be enforced, if some member has the strict 
incentive to make a choice with false pretension about its true type either 
during the first period or during the second period. If the members of S 
foresee at the time of designing a plan that a particular plan (xs, ys) may 
later induce such false pretension, they do not agree on the plan (xs, ys). 
They will consider only those plans that are Bayesian incentive-compatible. 
The present Bayesian incentive compatibility concept extends the original 
definition of d'Aspremont and Gkrard-Varet (1979) to the situations that are 
consistent with the information-pooling rule (Postulate 2.2). Suppose the 
members of coalition S agree upon plan (xs,ys) E 3'4 in the ex ante stage. 
Suppose division i's true type is &, i E S. In the first interim period, while 
division i is required to take action yli(&), it actually has liberty of taking 
any action from yl;(C), since its true type is private. Let ijl; E yli(T,) be the 
action it takes. The other divisions then infer that i's true type must be in 
the set Y1;l($li) C Ti. If jjli is a false action, that is, if ijli # yI;(&), division 
i is giving the others false information about its true type. Assuming that 
the other divisions are honest, division i in turn receives the information 
that division j's true type is in the set y;,'(ylj(Fj)), j E S \ {i). In the 
second interim period, division i can choose any action as long as its possible 
misrepresentation in the first interim period is not caught with this second- 
round action. Here, the other divisions have been led to believe that the true 
type-profile must be in the event 
Division i will not be caught in the second period, therefore, as long as it 
chooses its action ($2i7 6) from the set y2i(T) x xi@). Coalition S7s plan 
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(xs7 ys) is called Bayesian incentive-compatible, if division i cannot receive 
a higher benefit from any such pair of actions (ijli, (&;, &)) than from the 
honest actions. A precise definition, which is technically more involved, will 
be given at  the outset of Section 6. 
POSTULATE 2.3 (Bayesian Incentive Compatibility) The members 
of coalition S can design only Bayesian incentive-compatible plans. 
In the light of the Bayesian incentive compatibility, define to be the 
set of alldwable, Bayesian incentive-compatible plans for S, i.e., 
F: := {(xs, yS) E Fi  1 (xS7 yS) is Bayesian incentive-compatible}. 
Facts 6.1 and 6.2 in Section 6 establish necessary and sufficient conditions 
for an allowable plan (xs, ys) E FA to be Bayesian incentive-compatible. For 
any algebra B on T, let E(xi I B) : T -+ R be the conditional expectation of 
xi given 8, defined as 
where B(t) is the minimal element of B that contains t. One condition 
equivalent to the Bayesian incentive compatibility is 
which means that for any division i E S and for any minimal element A 
(C TI\{;}) of the information structure on the other divisions' types available 
to i after the first interim stage (an minimal element of A ( Y ~ , ~ \ ~ ; ) ) ) ,  the con- 
ditional expectation of x; given {ti} x A is independent of ti. This condition 
is not surprising, in view of the fact that the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function of each division i is i7s profit-imputation, in particular, it is 
type-independent . 
The set of strategies F: summarizes what coalition S can do by collabora- 
tion of its members. One may study the following game: Start with any plan 
(xi, yy) E F''. If the members of some coalition Sl E Z can improve upon 
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it,' the new coalition S1 will indeed be formed with its dominating strategy 
bundle ( x h ,  y&) E Ft, . Choose any (xhs,, E F;is1 . If the members of 
some other coalition S2 E Z can improve upon (x!, y;), the new coalition S2 
will be formed with its dominating strategy bundle (x:~, y&) E Fg2. In this 
way, there will be successive formations of coalitions, S1, S2, - .  ., in the ex 
ante period. The sequence of coalition formations may continue only until a 
particular strategy bundle (xi, y;) is reached in the 7th round, upon which 
no coalition can improve; in which case (x;, y;) is called a core plan, and 
the divisions will sign it as their self-enforcing contracts. The sequence of 
coalition formations may continue infinitely, so that there is no possibility for 
agreement; in which case the headquarters may step in to modify the game 
so that the modified game has a core plan. 
At present, the present authors do not know whether the game based 
upon the sets Fl, S E Z, really has a core plan. While this is left as an 
important open problem, this paper studies a modifkd game and establishes 
conditions for the existence of its core plan. The modified game introduces 
the possibility that the headquarters can play a role of insurer to the divisions. 
A plan (xs, ys) is called weakly Bayesian incentive-compatible if for all 
i E S, 
V t;, t: E T; : E{X; I ti) > E(x;(t:, .) I ti), 
where E(x; I ti) := E(xi ( ?;)(t). It is straightforward (see Fact 6.2 (ii)) that 
for a weakly Bayesian incentive-compatible plan (xs, ys) , the conditional 
expectation E(xi I ti) is independent of ti, that is, E{x; I IT;) is a constant 
function. This fact motivates the following formulation of the role of the 
headquarters as an insurer: 
POSTULATE 2.4 (Headquarters' Insurability) Let (XI, yI) be a tech- 
nologically attainable plan of the grand coalition such that it satisfies the 
information-pooling rule, and E{xi / ?;) is a constant function for each i E I. 
Then the plan ((Elxi I Z))iEI, yI) is available to the grand coalition I. 
Being an insurer is the only role that the headquarters plays in this game, 
in addition to participating in the coalitional design of a plan as one of 
the divisions. By Postulate 2.4, division i can receive the accounting profit 
according to the constant profit imputation plan E(xi 1 7;). This is justified 
8The precise content of "improve upon" will be clarified in the following Definition 2.5. 
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if the headquarters is risk-neutral. Moreover, this is an easy task for the 
headquarters, because it does not have to know the true type of division i 
(the need for insurance occurs only when E(xi I ti) is the same for all ti). 
Postulate 2.4 does not reduce the model to a static game. Indeed, while 
the profit imputation plan for the grand coalition, (E(x; I ZJ)iEz, stated in 
the postulate has a static flavor as a constant function, it is made possible 
by non-constant net output function yz, and the latter is subject to the 
information-pooling rule. One needs to study how the private information is 
processed in accordance with this rule. 
Postulate 2.4 (headquarters7 insurability) enlarges the feasible-strategy 
set of the grand coalition, in such a way that the newly introduced strate- 
- gies are consistent with the other postulates: Postulate 2.2 (information- 
pooling rule) and Postulate 2.3 (Bayesian incentive compatibility). Indeed, 
let (XI, yz) be a technologically attainable plan of the grand coalition such 
that yz satisfies the information-pooling rule, and E(x; 1 47;) is a constant 
function for each i E I. Then the plan (-(E(x; I 7;))iEI, yI) is Bayesian incen- 
tive compatible. 
The headquarters7 insurability is frequently observed in reality. If division 
i is performing unexpectedly poorly, the headquarters ends up paying more 
accounting profit to i than the amount that i contributes to the firm, which 
is a form of insurance. One the other hand, insurance among subordinate 
divisions rarely occurs; it occurs only through the headquarters. 
Formally, let HI be the set of all plans (xz, yI) for the grand coalition I 
such that XI is a constant function, and such that there exists xi  : 7" + ~ 1 ' 1  
for which (xi, yz) E F' and E(x: 1 '7;) = x; for every i E I. Notice that 
every member of HI is Bayesian incentive-compatible. In the light of the 
headquarters7 insurability, define: 
The set ps is the set of all technologically attainable plans of coalition S (or 
insurable plans - only in the case S = I) that are consistent with the three 
postulates (Postulates 2.2, 2.3, 2.4). Plan (xs, ys) is a candidate for coalition 
S7s agreement, iff (xs, ys) E Ps. 
Suppose the grand coalition I is considering a possible agreement ( x j ,  yj! E 
. Coalition S will improve upon (x;, yj), if it finds a plan (xs, 9s) E Fs 
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such that, for each member i, the conditional expectation of I; given t ( y l s )  
dominates the conditional expectation of x: given ~(TJ ;~) .  If plan (x;, y;) is 
not improved upon by any coalition, it becomes a self-enforcing agreement. 
A core plan is a plan of the grand coalition which is feasible and which cannot 
be improved upon by any coalition: 
DEFINITION 2.5 A core plan of profit-center game with incomplete in- 
formation D is a plan (x;, y;) of the grand coalition I such that 
(i) (x;, y;) E $1; and 
(ii) it is not true that there exist S E Z. and (xs, ys) E E's such that for all 
i E S ,  
A core plan (x;, y;) is called full-information revealing, if for every i E I, 
y;, is 1-1 on z. In this case, the algebra %(y;z) becomes the finest algebra 2*. 
Full information is revealed during the period of setting up manufacturing 
processes, and the subsequent choice of input/output vectors is based on the 
full information. 
A core plan is a descriptive solution concept. Ichiishi and Sertel (forth- 
coming, Example 4.4) shows that a full-information revealing core is not 
ex post Pareto optimal, and this non-optimality comes from Postulate 2.3 
(Bayesian incentive compatibility) and Postulate 2.2 (information-pooling 
rule). The role of Bayesian incentive compatibility in yielding inefficiency is 
well- known in the principal-agent literature. The information-pooling rule 
also creates inefficiency, because the first interim period strategy yli is sub- 
ject to the constraint of 'I;-measurability. 
For commodity a E ICn, denote by ri(t;, a) the ath component of ?-;(ti). 
A nonmarket intermediate commodity is a commodity a E IC,, such that 
ri(ti, a) = 0 for all i E 1 and t E T, but such that the firm produces it (at 
some division, say i) and internally uses it (at another division, say j) .  Since 
there is no market price for this commodity, division j does not know how 
much transfer payment to make to division i for its use. However, a core 
imputation plan x; provides an answer. 
To state the basic assumption of the present paper, define 
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and define also K2n, IClm, k2n, klm and kPm analogously. The initial 
resource function r; may be written as 
where rl; is a function from Z to Rkln, and the components of rl;jti) corre- 
spond to K1,. 
The following Assumption 2.6 imposes conditions on the production set 
of each division. In particular, (ii) says that zero production activity is 
possible; (iii) means free disposal; and (iv) means the impossibility of the 
Land of Cockaigne, that is, only a finite quantity of outputs is produced 
from a finite quantity of inputs. 
ASSUMPTION 2.6 (Basic Assumptions on t h e  Product ion Sets)  
For each i, 
(i) the production set Y; is closed in RklTI; 
(ii) 0 E Y;; 
(iii) Y; - RYT' c Y;;  
(iv) for each ni E ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 1 ,  the production possibility set {mi E RI~PI I
(m;, n;) E Y;) is bounded from above. 
The following Assumption 2.7 imposes conditions on the resource function 
of each division. In particular, (i) says that there are nonmarket commodities 
which are used or produced in the first period. Condition (ii) says that rl; 
takes different values for different types of division i; the fourth through the 
seventh paragraphs of the present section have given a detailed account of 
the necessity of this 1-1 property, when i7s type is defined as a state of its 
technology embodied in its initial investment. Condition (iii) says that all 
resources are nonnegative. 
ASSUMPTION 2.7 (Basic Assumptions on t h e  Resource Functions) 
( i )  ICln # 0; 
For each i E I, 
(ii) the function rl; is 1-1 on 2''; 
(iii) r;(ti) > 0, for all ti E T,. 
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R E M A R K  2.8 In the present model, divisions spend one period for setting 
up manufacturing processes and another period for actual manufacturing. In 
reality, however, divisions repeat manufacturing in many subsequent periods, 
forecasting at each period the new market demand condition. So, one needs 
a model of one set-up period and arbitrarily many periods for repeated man- 
ufacturing. This task is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper. 
3 Convex Production Sets 
The first result of this paper is the following existence theorem for the neoclas- 
sical case of convex technology. The theorem is consistent with the presence 
of nonmarket intermediate commodities. 
T H E O R E M  3.1 Let V be a profit-center game with incomplete information 
which satisfies Postulates 2.2-2.4 (information-pooling rule, Bayesian incen- 
tive compatibility, and headquarters' insurability) and Assumptions 2.6-2.7 
{basic assumptions on the production sets, and on the resource functions). 
Assume moreover that the production set K is convex, for each i E I. Then 
there exists a full-information revealing core plan of the game. 
R E M A R K  3.2 Instead of the approach of the text in which E;., i E I ,  are 
given primitive data, consider a more general approach in which coalitional 
total production sets Y(S), S E 2, are given. Theorem 3.1 still holds true 
if each Y ( S )  satisfies Assumptions 2.6-2.7, convexity, and the following bal- 
ancedness condition: For any balanced subfamily B of Z and for any associ- 
ated balancing coefficients {XS)SEB, it follows that CsEa XsY(S) C Y(I). 
The balancedness condition makes explicit the extent to which external 
economies should prevail in the grand coalition. Notice that if Y(5) = 
CiES Y;, then the balancedness condition is automatically satisfied. O 
R E M A R K  3.3 In the specific instance of a production set given by Y ,  = 
ntETY,(t), all the assumptions on Y; of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied, provided 
that each x ( t )  satisfies Assumptions 2.6-2.7 and convexity. O 
R E M A R K  3.4 Fix the data ({Z, x ; ) ; ~ ~ ,  (Y;:, r2i(-))iEz, p )  throughout this 
remark. Then, a profit-center game ( {T ,  T ; )  jE17 {Y;, T ; ( - ) ) ; ~ ~ ,  p) is identified 
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k1nlT:I with the function rl I(-). By varying rlI(-) E HiEI R+ , one obtains differ- 
ent profit-center games. Therefore, the set G := Hi,, R:~'~", endowed with 
the relativized Euclidean topology, becomes the Baire space of profit-center 
games. It is easy to see that the subset 
is open and dense in G. So, without condition (ii) of Assumption 2.7, a 
generic existence theorem still holds true. The same remark applies also to 
Theorem,4.2. 0 
4 Distributive Total Production Set of the 
Grand Coalition 
This section presents an existence theorem for a particular technology which 
satisfies increasing returns to scale. The theorem, however, excludes nonmar- 
ket intermediate commodities. Nevertheless, nonmarket commodities held as 
the initial resources can be exchanged among the divisions, and a core im- 
putation plan describes in part transfer payments for these exchanges. 
Introduce a fictitious price vector, q := ( ~ ( t ) ) ~ ~ ~ ,  q(t) = -(ql(t), q2(t)) E 
R$. x RFn, for type-profile-contingent nonmarket commodities; this is to 
utilize a cost function concept in the analysis. Set q(t) := (q(t, a)),Eh',. One 
may choose the unit simplex, 
as the price domain. 
The exclusion of nonmarket intermediate commodities means that all the 
nonrnarket commodities are only used as inputs. Given a market net output 
plan m : T -+ Rkm,  therefore, one may define the input-requirement set as 
A cost function is then defined as the function g : (I;! x RkrnlTl -+ R+ which 
associates to each pair of a fictitious price vector and a market net output 
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plan (q, m) the minimal cost of using nonmarket commodities in order to 
produce m under q. Formally, it is defined by 
g(q, rn) := inf {- c q(t) n(t) I - n E Syl(m) 
t€T 
The concept of weak Bayesian incentive compatibility was introduced 
earlier (in the second paragraph following Postulate 2.3). Another type of 
cost function which accommodates the weak Bayesian incentive compatibil- 
ity, C? :,Qx fi++ R+, is now defined: In order to do so, choose any profit 
level q, and consider the set of all pairs of a profit imputation plan and a total 
net output plan (xs, CiES y;) such that (1) each y; is technologically feasible, 
(2) the total imputation CiES xi(t) is met by the total profit CiESp-mi(t) for 
every possible type-profile t ,  and (3) the conditional expectations E(xi I ti) 
of the imputations x; given i7s private information ?;, i E S7 are summed up 
at least to q for any possible type-profile t. Formally, the set is given as: 
Define the mathematical programming problem, 
Problem Ps(q, q) : Minimize - qjt) - n(t), 
tE  T 
subject to (xs, y) E Cs(q). 
The required cost function is the optimal value of Problem Ps(q7 q): 
The remark at  the end of this section briefly sketches why the function c'fc 
takes into account the weak Bayesian incentive compatibility (see Remark 
4.6). 
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For a net output plan y; for which yl; is 'T;-measurable, the cost is 
so Problem Ps(q, 7) has an optimal solution, if 
and 
' J t  E T :  q2(t) >> 0. 
The same remark applies to the earlier minimization problem that defines 
g(q7 m). This fact motivates the following definitions: 
Problem Ps(q, 7) and the problem for g(q, m) have optimal solutions, if q E 
Q+. 
The main theorem of this section (Theorem 4.2) is based on the following 
Assumption 4.1, which replaces the convexity assumption made in Theorem 
3.1. Remark 4.3 below shows that it is a strengthened version of Scarf's 
(1986) distributiveness assumption. Condition (i) of Assumption 4.1 means 
increasing returns to scale. Condition (ii) means that nonmarket commodi- 
ties are only used as inputs and cannot be produced; in particular it excludes 
nonmarket intermediate commodities. Condition (iii) says that cfU'C can be 
continuously extended from Q+ x h+ to Qx h+. Condition (iv) means the 
convexity of each production possibility set. Condition (v) means diminish- 
ing marginal rate of technical substitution. 
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ASSUMPTION 4.1 (Strongly Distributive Total Production Set of 
the  Grand Coalition) 
(i) For any yr E YI and any real number CY > 1, it follows that oyr E YI; 
kn lTI (ii) for any i E I, k; c ~ ~ ~ l ~ l  x (-R+ ); 
(iii) cost function C;" : Q X  k+-+ R+ is continuous; 
(iv) for any q E Q+, the cost function g(q, -) is strictly quasi-convex; 
(v) for each m, the input-requirement set Sy,(m) is strictly convex. 
A stronger form of exclusion of a nonmarket intermediate commodity is 
assumed in Theorem 4.2: Condition (1) in the theorem says that if all non- 
market commodities are used as inputs at any type-profile, then a positive 
profit can be  made at any type-profile; in particular, it excludes those divi- 
sions that  produce only nonmarket intermediate commodities (the firm with 
such a division will be analyzed in Section 5). Condition (2) says that each 
division is endowed with all nonmarket commodities a t  the outset a t  any 
type-profile, which again excludes a nonmarket intermediate commodity. 
THEOREM 4.2 Let 27 be a profit-center game with incomplete information 
which satisfies Postu2ates 2.2-2.4 and Assumptions 2.6-2.7 and 4.1. Assume 
moreover that 
(1) for any n; E R ~ ~ ~ ~ I  for which n; << 0,  there exists y: E k; such that 
n; < n:, yii is ?;-measurable, and p . rn:(t) > 0 for all t E T; and 
(2) r;(t;) >> 0, for every i E I and every t E T. 
Then there exists a full-information revealing core plan of the game. 
REMARK 4.3 Consider a production economy in which the commodities 
are classified into two categories, say nl products and 6 2  production factors. 
Scarf (1986) defined a distributive set as a production set Y (C R"' x (-R?)) 
which has the following property (here, the usual sign convention is adopted, 
so a coordinate of activity (y, z) E Y, y E ELK1 and z E -R;2 , is positive or 
negative according to  whether the  corresponding commodity is a net output 
or a net input): 
For any finitely many activities (yh, zh) E Y, h = 1, - .  , I  and any 
nonnegative real numbers a h ,  h = 1,. . , l such that  xi=, *hzh 5 
h h  z' for all i = 1,. . , I ,  it follows tha t  c;,~ ah(y , 2 ) E Y .  
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Now, given cost function g(q,-) : RKl -.t R, define the "production setn Y 
by 
P := {(m, -w) E RKI x (-R+) I g(q,m) 5 w). 
Then, it is not difficult to show that if g(q,.) is quasi-convex and subho- 
rnogeneous, then Y is a distributive set. (The proof is a straightforward 
application of the support theorem.) 
R E M A R K  4.4 Consider the coalitional total production set approach. The- 
orem 4.2 still holds true, if Y(S) C Y(I) for every S e 2, and if Y(I) satisfies 
all the conditions that are imposed on Y in Theorem 4.2. 
R E M A R K  4.5 The conditions in Theorem 4.2 assume implicitly that ad- 
justment of non-commodity resources (such as a plant) and/or effort to each 
net output plan plays an important role. Indeed, the specific instance of 
Y; = ntET x ( t )  is in general inconsistent with conditions (i) and {iv) of As- 
sumption 4.1. To see this, consider a simple example of: 11 = 1, T = (t, t'), 
Y(t) ~=r Y{t1), lIi'n1 = IIClnl = 1, llCml = 1, p = 1 and q(t) = q(tf) 1=1 1/2. 
Choose any 
(YO), O), (07 yt(t')) E Y, 
so that 
q(t)n(t) = q(tf)n'(t') = g(q7 m) = g{97 mt)- 
Then, by strict quasi-convexity of g(q, .), 
1 (Ty(t), iyt(t')) E interior of Y{t) x Y(tl), 
which contradicts condition (i). CI 
R E M A R K  4.6 Let (xs, y) be an optimal solution to Problem Ps(q, 7). To 
prove that it is weakly Bayesian incentive-compatible, it suffices to show 
in view of Fact 6.2 (ii). Suppose 
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Then, by subtracting a positive constant from x; on the minimal member of 
- 
?; that contains {ti} x Tqji), one obtains a Ts-measurable function xi (< xi) 
for which 
Then, there exists y: E Y;: such that 
V t  E T :  x x j  < x P - r n j ( t ) ,  and 
iES ieS 
which contradicts the optimality of (xs, y). O 
5 Complementary Suppliers of Nonmarket 
Intermediate Commodit ies 
The preceding two sections focused on the role of returns to scale, non- 
increasing or increasing. The present section, on the other hand, focuses on 
the role of a structural relationship between two types of divisions, the sup- 
pliers and the customers. The suppliers produce and supply to the customers 
nonmarket intermediate commodities. The customers use these nonmarket 
intermediate commodities, produce market commodities and bring in profit 
to the firm. The products of all suppliers are needed for each customer's pro- 
duction activities, hence the term complementary suppliers. No assumption 
on returns to scale is made. The idea about this relationship goes back .to 
Radner (1 992, Subsection 7.2). The following are a formal treatment of its 
simplified version in the context of incomplete information. 
The division set, I, is partitioned into the supplier set, I,, and the cus- 
tomer set, I,. Let ILS be the set of nonmarket intermediate commodities, 
a subset of I(,. A net output plan y; is denoted by (mi, n,;,n,;), where the. 
subvectors n,; and n,; correspond to I(,, and I(, \ I(,,, respectively. 
The following Assumption 5.1 highlights the role of complementary sup- 
pliers of nonmarket intermediate commodities. In particular, (i) says that a 
supplier can produce only nonmarket intermediate commodities; (ii) says that 
all the suppliers are needed in order to produce all nonmarket intermediate 
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commodities; (iii) says that for a customer to produce a market comrnod- 
ity, all the nonmarket intermediate commodities are needed; (iv) says that 
a coalition of a customer and all the suppliers can make a positive profit if 
all the nonmarket non-intermediate commodity resources are available (even 
if in arbitrarily small amount); (v)(a) says that no nomarket intermediate 
commodities are available as initial resources (so that they have to be pro- 
duced by suppliers); and (v)(b) says that all the nonmarket non-intermediate 
commodities are available as initial resources in the grand coalition. 
A S S U M P T I O N  5.1 ([Complementary Supplier]-Customer Relation- 
ship) 
(i) For each supplier i E I,, if y; E Y;:, then m; 5 0 and n,; < 0. 
(ii) If y; E Y, for each supplier i, and if n,;(t) >> 0 for some t .E T ,  then 
for this t, n,;(t) > 0 for every i E I,. 
(iii) For each customer i E I, and each t E T, if [y; E E: and 1 nsi(t) << 01, 
then m;(t) 5 0. 
(iv) For any i E I, and any E > 0, there exists y~*~{; )  E YIlu(i) such that each 
ylj is ?-measurable, j E I, U {i), and 
(v)(a) For each division i E I, r,; = 0 ( E  ~ k n *  ITI); 
(b) C;,I 7-2; >> 0. 
A customer has to use some nonmarket non-intermediate commodities 
in the first interim period, e.g., human asset. Therefore, Assumption 2.7 
is consistent with the present setup of supplier-customer relationship. The 
following existence theorem is valid regardless of the nature of returns to 
scale. 
T H E O R E M  5.2 Let 2) be a profit-center game with incomplete information 
which satisfies Postulates 2.2-2.4 and Assumptions 2.6-2.7 and 5.1. Then 
there exists a full-information revealing core plan of the game. 
R E M A R K  5.3 Theorem 5.2 still holds true in the specific instance of a 
production set given by Y;: = nllETY,(t). C1 
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6 Sorne Details and Proofs 
This section begins with the precise definition of Bayesian incentive compat- 
ibility and its several characterization results (Facts 6.1 and 6.2). 
A pretension function of division i is a function a : Ti 4 T;, which says 
that when its true type is ti, it acts (makes a choice) as though its type 
were a(ti). Given any algebra Bi on Ti, denote by endo (T;, Bi) the set of 
all functions that map each ti into the minimal set of 13; that contains ti. 
Indeed, let P be the partition of T, that consis%s of the minimal nonempty 
members of 8;. Then, 
endo (Ti, 8;) := (a : Ti 4 Ti 1 V P E P : a ( P )  .C P). 
If every member of coalition S has information structure 8; about division 
i's type, then i can only choose a pretension function a E endo (T;, 8;). 
Suppose the members of 5 are deliberating on whether or not to agree 
on a plan (xs, ys). In the first period, division i's information structure is 
given as Z, which is private. So, division i is not caught in the first period 
no matter which choice it makes from {yli(ti) I ti E Ti); that is, it can make 
a choice according to any pretension function a E endo (T;, {0, T;) ) ,  so that 
when division i's true type is 6, it makes the choke. yli(a(fi)). By acting 
according to  the function yl; o a, division i having its true type 6 passes on 
to all the other members of S the information that event A := y~'(yl io  a(<)) 
has occurred. This information may be false, that is, fi may not be a member 
of A, but the other members take it as i7s testimony about itself and expect 
that i will act according to this information in the second period, that is, i 
will have to make a choice from (xi, yzi)(A) in the second period. Therefore, 
i7s pretension function in the second period has to be of the form T o a for 
some T E endo (X, A( yli)). 
The present concept of Bayesian incentive compatibility says that division 
i cannot benefit from any pair of pretension functions that are not caught. 
Formally, a plan (xs, ys) is called Bayesian incentive-compatible, if for all 
i E S, all a E endo (X, (0, Ti)), and all T E: endo (Ti, A{yli)), 
V t E T : E (xi I t ( y l s ) )  (t) 2 E (xi 0 ( r  0 a, id) I t (yls))  (t), 
where id is the identity map on Ts\{;). 
The first characterization (Fact 6.1) is proved in the same way as in the 
first paragraph of Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994, Section 4, p. 159). 
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F A C T  6.1 Plan (xs, ys) E Fi  is Bayesian incentive-compatible, i$ for all 
i E S, all a E endo (T,, {0, T,)), and all t E T, E (xi I %(yls)) (t) 2 
(2; 0 (0, id) ( f(Y1s)) (t). 
F A C T  6.2 (i) Plan (xs, ys) E F& is Bayesian incentive-compatible, ifl 
(ii) For any weakly Bayesian incentive-compatible plan (xs,ys) and for any 
i E S, E(xi  1 '7;) is a constant function on T. 
Proof (i) The sufficiency is trivial, so it suffices to  show the necessity. 
Choose any a E endo (x, (0, Ti)) and any f E T. Let {f;) x A (C T) be 
the  minimal element of t ( y l s )  that contains i. Then, by the  present setup 
of x(t) = ni .n;.(t;), 
(here, set A, which is of the form njEs\(;} Aj x njEI\s Tj, is identified with 
njEs\{;} Aj). By Fact 6.1, the Bayesian incentive compatibility says: for all 
a E endo (Ti, (0, Ti)), 
E (xi I %(YIs)) (g t E (xi 0 (a ,  id) ( %(yls)) (Q . (2) 
This is true for any &, any a, and any So, 
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which is the  required result. 
(ii) Choose any a E endo (T;, (0, T;)). By the present setup of ~ ( t )  =
II; ri(ti) 7 
E ( x ~  0 (a, id) 1 &) = Z (2 rj(tj)) xi(a(fi), t~\{i}) 
t~\{i}eTs\{i} 
= E(x; 1 cr(&)). 
Then the  weak Bayesian incentive compatibility says 
hence the required result. 0 
Recall that TI; is a function only of ti E Ti, and so is variable nl;, the 
subvector of n; that corresponds t o  (Postulate 2.2). For a net output 
plan y; : T -+ Rk, denote by yi(t, a )  the ath coordinate of y;(t), (t, a )  E T x K .  
L E M M A  6.3 Suppose 
Then, for each i there exists a function zl; : Ti -+ Rkln such that Eli i< nl; 
and 
Proof S t e p  1 .  It will be shown first that if 
then 
This will be done in the following Steps 2-4. Only in these Steps 2-4, simplify- 
ing notation will be used, so that  n;(t;, &), n;($, &), nj(tl, &), ri(t;, &), riffi, &), 
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r;(t:, 6) ,  etc., will be denoted by n;, ii;, n:, ri, i;;, r:, etc., respectively, and 
the set of divisions I will be identified with the set of integers {1,2, - - . , I) 
(where the last integer in the set is 111, by abuse of notation). Condition (4) 
is then re-written as: . 
S t e p  2 .  If for all (t2, t3, - + ,  tI), 
then there is nothing to prove. So assume 
- 3 (t',, t$, . . . , t i )  : -nl - n', - n$ - - .  .- n; = Fl + r; + r; + . . . + r;. 
Then, 
Indeed, if there exists 4 for which 
then by adding the two equalities, 
- (-el - n2 - C3 - . . . - iiI) + (-iil - n i  - n$ - . . - 4 )  
I 
= (-nl - n 2  -n$  - ... - n;) + (-61 - ii2 - 53  - . . . - CI) 
= (fl + ri + r; + + . *  + r';) + (F1 + f2  + f3 + . + fI)  
= (fl + F2 + F3 + - - .  + TI) + (F1 + ri + r$ + - + .  + r;). 
BY (4), 
I 
-61 - n 2  - n $ -  . - - - n ;  > r" l+r ;+r i+- - -+r ' ; ,  
which contradicts (3).  
S t e p  3. If for all ( t l ,  t3, t4, - - - , tI)> 
then there is nothing to prove. So assume 
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Then, 
Indeed, if there exists (&,&) for which 
then by adding the two equalities, 
which contradicts (3). 
Step 4.  Continuing this way, one can prove that if for each i, 1 < i < I - 1, 
there exists ( t i , .  . - , t:-l, - . . , ti) for which 
then for all (t17 t2,. - - , t ~ - I ) ,  
This is precisely the required result stated in Step I.  
Step 5. Suppose (4) holds true. Then, by Step 1, one may choose il and 
c > 0 such that for all tI\(;,) 
with equality for at least one tI\~i,l.  Define n$) : T, -4 Rkln by 
(1) , , ) - , if (i, ti, a)  = (il,  &, , ii); ni (ti,a) := 
ni(ti , a )  , otherwise. 
The function n!:) satisfies (3), and n$) 5 n,;. Moreover, by the choice of 
E ,  the number of strict inequalities in (3) is less for n$) than for nip If (4) 
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(1) is true for n l I ,  repeat the procedure (Steps 1-4) and obtain n$) (< n$)). 
At each repetition, the number of strict inequalities in (3) strictly decreases. 
After finitely many steps, one obtains equality in (3). 
Sets &, S E 2, are neither convex nor closed, which causes difficulty 
in proving existence theorems (Theorem 3.1 and 4.2). To overcome this 
difficulty, Radner's (1979) technique is adopted: Instead of using sets F;, 
one considers a larger set of (XI, ys) such that (xs, yzs) is '&-measurable and 
each yl; is '7;-measurable. A plan (x;, y;) which satisfies all the equilibrium 
conditions (Definition 2.5) except the information-pooling rule {Postulate 
2.3) is obtained. In fact, one looks for (x;,y;) such that each n;; is 1-1. 
Given the injectiveness of n;;, i E I, the algebra generated by y;' is the 
finest algebra 2T, so (x;, y;) satisfies the information-pooling rule. 
Proof  of Theorem 3.1 Define 
(XI, ys) is weakly G? := {(XI, YS) t GI Bayesian incentive-compatible 
and define the non-side-payment games, : I -+ R' and VwiC : Z -+ R*, by 
?(s) := {uI E R' 13 (xs7 ys) E : V i E S : u; j EL;}, 
Vwi'(s) := {uI E R' 1 3 (XI, ys) E G? : V i E S : U; < Ex;], 
where Ex; := CtET x;(t)x(t), the ex ante expected profit attributed to i. 
Game Vw" is balanced. Indeed, let B be a balanced subfamily of Z 
with the associated balancing coefficients and choose any u E 
%E B Vw"(S). For each S E 8, there exists (xiS), yjS));Es E G p  such that 
ui 5 EX:') for every i E S. Define (xI, yI) by 
By the present convexity condition on Y,,  (xI, yI) E GI.  Since each E ( X ~ ~ )  / 
'7;) is a constant function on T by Fact 6.2 (ii), so is E{x; I '7;) as a weighted 
average of these functions. Therefore, (xI, yI) E G T .  Since u; I< Exi, it 
follows that u E VwiC. 
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By the Scarf theorem (see, e.g., Scarf (1973, Theorem 8.3.6, p. 211)), one 
can choose u* in the core of game Vwic. Let (51, vz) E G;U'c be the plan that 
gives rise to  u*. By Fact 6.1, G P  > Ft, so u* cannot be improved upon by 
any proper coalitions in game V. 
By Lemma 6.3, for each i there exists a 2-measurable function Eli : T + 
~ ~ 1 ' "  such that - 
- 
nli 5 Eli, 
and 
- 
, 
Each zli is 1-1 on Ti. Indeed, this follows from the identity, 
V t E T : gli (ti) + rli(ti) = - C (EU (tj) + rU(tj)), 
3€ Nil 
and the facts that the right-hand side is constant once tz\(;) is fixed, and that 
rli(.) is 1-1 on (Assumption 2.7 (ii)). 
Define f; := E(5; I 'Ti), and define the plan (x;, y;) by 
By the free disposal assumption (Assumption 2.6 (iii)), (gZ, y;) E G)U'". Since 
n;; is 1-1 on Ti for all i, it follows that t(y;I)  is the finest algebra 2T for 
every i, so (51, 9;) E Ff. By the headquarters' insurability (Postulate 2.4), 
(17, y;) E &I. Notice that E gi = EZ; 2 uf .  It is also easy to check that u* 
lies in the Pareto frontier of P( I ) .  Thus, u* is in the core of game P. The 
plan (x;, y;) is full-information revealing. 
The plan (x;, yf) is the required core plan of the profit-center game. In- 
deed, if there exist S E Z and (xs, ys) E such that for all i E S, 
v t E T : E ( x ~  I t ( n s ) ) ( t )  2 Ejxf I t(n;))(t),  and 
3 t E 7' : E(xi / %(ns))(t) > E(xf ( %(n;))(t), 
then Ex; > Exf for every i E S, which contradicts the fact that u* is in the 
core of game V. C1 
To prove Theorem 4.2, two results in the earlier literature are recalled: 
First, consider a static coalition production economy with one primary good 
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and one final good, ({C;, u;, r;);€=, c), where 1 is a finite set of economic 
agents, C; (C R:) is a strategy set of agent i (a; := (q;, (;) E C; means i's 
consumption of 7; units of the final good and {; units of the primary good), 
u; : C; -., R is a utility function of agent i, r; > 0 is the initial resource of 
primary good held by agent i, and c : R+ + R+ is the cost function, which 
is common to all coalitions ( ~ ( 7 )  is the minimal amount of the primary good 
that is needed to produce 77 units of the final good). The following Theorem 
6.4 is due to Scarf (1973): 
T H E O R E M  6.4 (Scarf) Let ( (xi ,  u;, T ; ) ; ~ ~ ,  C) be a coalition production 
economy with one primary good and one final good. Define the non-side- 
payment game V : Z --t RI by 
If each u; is nondecreasing in R:, and if 
then the game V is balanced. 
The second result is on a family of parameterized static societies: Let 
I be a finite set of players, let C; be a strategy space of player i E I, and 
let Q be a parameter space. Define Cs := njGsl=;, and set C := CI. For 
each coalition S E 1, a feasible-strategy correspondence Qs : Q -+ Cs is 
given. Correspondence f4 : Q x C -, Q describes nature's response set 
9(q,  aI) (C Q) to each pair (q, aI) of a parameter q and a strategy bundle 
a ~ .  Let u; : Q x C; -+ R be i's utility function. A family of parameterized 
societies is a list of specified data, ({xi)iE17 9 ,  {QS)SEZ, f4,  (u;);~I). A 
social coalitional equilibrium of the parameterized family of societies is a pair 
of a parameter value and a strategy bundle {q*,~;)  E -Q x C such that (i) 
a; E Qr(q*), q* E Q(q*, a;), and (ii) it is not true that there exist S € Z and 
as E iPs(q*) for which ui.(q*, a;) > u;{q*, a f )  for every i E S. 
T H E O R E M  6.5 Let ({xi)iEI7 Q, {@S)SEI, @, ( u ~ ) ~ ~ ~ )  be a family ofpa- 
rameterized societies. There exists a social coalitional equilibrium if: 
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(i) Xi is a nonempty, convex, compact subset of a Euclidean space for every 
i E I ,  and so is Q; 
(ii) for every S E Z, QS is both upper semicontinuous and lower semicontin- 
uous in Q,  and is nonempty- and closed-valued; 
(iii) for every i E I ,  u; is continuous in Q x C ; ;  
(iv) for every ij E Q,  the non-side-payment game I$ : 2' -+ R' defined b y  
is balanced; 
(v) for every ij E Q and for every utility allocation ii in the core of &, the 
set {az E: @ ~ ( q )  I V i E I : iii 5 ui(ij, a;)} is convex; and 
(vi) Q is upper semicontinuous in Q x C ,  and is nonempty-, dosed- and 
convex-valued. 
Theorem 4.2 will be proved by applying the technique of Ichiishi and 
Quinzii (1983) modified suitably for the present purpose: Roughly stated, a 
family of societies I? := Q, {@S}SEI, Q, { u ; } ~ ~ ~ )  parameterized 
by price vector q E Q is constructed from the profit-center game ({T; ,  T ; ) ; ~ ~ ,  
{Y;:, r;(.))iEz, p). The parameterized family I? will be shown to satisfy the 
assumptions of Theorem 6.5. From a social coaiitional equilibrium of I?, one 
can easily construct the required core plan of the original profit-center game. 
Recall, however, the cost-minimization problem PI(q,q) and the partition 
of the price domain into (Q+,Qo}, defined in Section 4. To be precise, in 
view of the fact that Problem PI(q, q) may not have an optimal solution if 
q E Qo, a sequence of parameterized families of societies (r")~?, is actually 
constructed, a social coalitional equilibrium (q", a:) of rU is chosen for each 
Y, and a limit point (q, 5') of the sequence -(qv,a;), is considered. 
The definition of r "  is now presented. The fictitious price vector q for the 
type-profile-contingent nonmarket commodities, introduced at  the outset of 
Section 4, will play the sole of parameter in I?". Define 
Since Q, C Q+, Problem PI(q,q) has an optimal solution for all (q,q) E 
Q,x l%+. The parameter space of TY is, therefore, the trimmed simplex Q,. 
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Define a lower bound and an upper bound for the maximal profit: 
From ~ s d u m ~ t i o n  2.6 (iv) and the present conditions ((1) positive profitabil- 
ity from strict inputs and (2) strict positiveness of ri(ti)), it follows that 
0 < - q 5 ? < GO. The strategy spaces are defined as 
Division i's strategy (q;, Cj) E Ci is identified with q; E jq,?] since <; 0, 
and is interpreted as the profit attributed to it. To use t g  language of the 
model of Theorem 6.4, (q;, Ci) means i's consumption of q; units of the "final 
good7?, and no consumption of the "primary goody7. Define Cs := nSs Ci7 
and set C := Cz. 
The feasible-strategy correspondences iDS : Q + Cs, S E Z, are defined 
(To be precise, the restriction of as to QY is used for I?".) 
The utility functions of rY are given as 
LEMMA 6.6 There exists a continuous function 
such that for each (q, q), (si(q, r7) ,  y*(q, g ) )  : T + ~1' x Rk is an optimal 
solution to Problem Pz(q7 7). 
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Proof Step 1. Given q E Q+ and any function x : T 4 R, the problem, 
Minimize q(t) . (-n(t)), 
t€T 
subject to -n E Sy,(m), and 
has a unique solution y8(q, s). Indeed, let y := (m, n) and y' := (m', n') be 
solutions. Then, 
9(q, m) = 9lq7 m'). 
If m # m', set mN := (m + m1)/2. By strict quasi-convexity of g(q, -), 
and clearly 
V t E T : x(t) 5 p - ml'(t), 
which contradicts the optimality of y. Therefore m = m'. By strict convexity 
of SyI (m) , n = n'. 
Step 2 .  Using the subvector n8(q, x) of y8(q, x) obtained in Step 1, Prob- 
lem Pz(q, q) is equivalent to: 
Minimize 
- C q(t) n* (q, C zi)(t), 
t€T ie I 
subject to r) 5 C min E(xi I Z)(t ) .  
i€ z t€T 
Let XI and x> be two optimal solutions of this problem. Then, one may 
assume without loss of generality, 
To show this, notice first that 
Indeed, if this equality is false, set 
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Then, 
which contradicts the optimality of (xI, m*(q, CieI 5;)). One can then define 
Step 3. By the maximum theorem, the function (q, 7) I-, x*{q, 7)(.) is 
continuous on Q+ x k+. The set of optimal solutions of the problem Pz(q, 7) 
is now given as 
By Walkup and Wets (1969), this polyhedron depends continuous piecewise 
linearly on the right-hand-side parameter of the constraint, (7, x*-(q, ?)(-)); 
that is, there are finitely many continuous piecewise linear functions hf , j E 
J7 such that for each (7, x*{q, 7)(.)), 
I + 
{the extreme points of the polyhedron given (q, x*(q, ?)(a))) 
c {hj(7,x*(q7 q)(.)) I j E J ) .  
V ~ E T :  
Cs1E(x i  I ti) 3 7, 
c;,z x;(t) 5 x*(q7 7710) 
In particular, each extreme point depends continuously on ( q , ~ ) .  This es- 
T x  I1 tablishes the required choice of x; : Q+x &++ R I  . 
Step 4.  Define 
where y* of the right-hand side is given in Step 1 and x* is given in Step 2. 
13 
The correspondence : Q, x C --+ Q, of the parameterized society I'" 
is defined by: q0 E Qu(ij, (QZ, 0 ) )  iff q0 maximizes the value of the "total 
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excess demand for the 'nonmarket commodities' ". That is, qO solves the 
mathematical programming problem, 
Maximize C q(t) - qj)(t) - C ri(ti) 
tET iE  I 
subject to q E Q,, 
where n*(q, CjEI qj)(.) : T + Rkn is given in Lemma 6.6. Solution q0 (E 
9(q, (?I, 0 ) ) )  assigns a large weight (i.e., qO(f, 5) > l /u)  only if the excess 
demand for (6 5) is the greatest for all (t, a) E T x I.(n. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2 Step 1. For each u large enough so that Q, r f  0, 
' 
the family of parameterized societies 
that is constructed from the profit-center game 
is well-defined and satisfies conditions (i) and (iii) of Theorem 6.5. 
One may assume without loss of generality that c p  = cy"" for all S. 
Indeed, by Assumption 2.6 (ii), c p  > c p  for all S. A core plan of the 
(hypothetical) profit-center game in which every coalition S has access to 
the cost function cy"" is also a core plan of the (original) profit-center game, 
since in the latter game the "blocking power" of S is weaker, so more plans 
are coalitionally stable than in the former game. 
The family rV satisfies condition (ii) of Theorem 6.5. Indeed, In view of 
Assumption 4.1 (iii) and strict positiveness of r;(ti), the standard technique in 
the neoclassical consumer theory to establish upper and lower sernicontinuity 
of the budget-set correspondence is applicable. 
The family I'" satisfies condition (iv) of Theorem 6.5. Indeed, by As- 
sumption 4.1 (i), for each given q E Q, 
Therefore, for each q E Q, the non-side-payment game Tic : 1 -+ R' defined 
by 
%w'c(~)  := { u  E R' 1 3 0s E Es(q) : V i E S : ui 5 ui(q, oi)} 
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is balanced by Theorem 6.4. 
The family I?" satisfies condition (v) of Theorem 6.5. Indeed, choose any 
i j  E Q, and any utility allocation .Ei E R'. Let uy,a: E QI(ij) be such that 
and for each Q E [O,l] define alQ E C by 
Clearly, ii; < u;(ij,ap) for all i .E I. It suffices to show that crlQ E iPI(ij). 
Let (xy, yo) E CI(CiEI $) be an optimal solution to Problem PI(ij, CiGI $). 
Then, 
g(ij, mO) = cyiC(ij, C vP) < C C q(t) ri(ti)- 
i€ I i E I  tET 
Similarly, for an optimal solution (xi, yl) to Problem PI(q, CiEI q!), 
Define 
(x:,  ma) := a(x;, ml) + (1 - cr)(x:, mO). 
By Assumption 4.1 (iv), for any a E [0, 11, 
On the other hand, for any n; for which nli is '7;-measurable and (ma7 CiEI n;) E 
CiE~ E;, it follows that (x:, ma7 CiEI n;) E CI(CiEI gp), so that 
and consequently, 
c F G ,  C 7s) 5 9(g, ma). 
ic I 
Therefore, 
that is, a? E Q(ij). 
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The family I?" satisfies condition (vi) of Theorem 6.5 by the maximum 
theorem. 
Thus, all the assumptions of Theorem 6.5 are satisfied. Let (q", a;) E 
Q, x t: be a social coali tional equilibrium of r " .  By definition of \TIu, q" E Q+. 
Let 
x ,  9 )  = (xi(9". z 7-3 Y*(ru7 c 7;) ; 
&I i E l  
it is an optimal solution to Problem Pl(qU, CiEI $). Let y: E YI give rise 
to y" (in. particular, y" = CiEl 9:). One may choose yy so that each y,"; is 
?;-measuiable. 
Step 2. The sequence {nu), (C -R?'~ ')  obtained in Step 1 is bounded. 
To show this, suppose the contrary. Then, there exists a subsequence, still 
denoted by {nu),, such that 
for some choice of coordinate (tV, a") for each v. For each v, define L" (C 
T x Ii',) as the set of (type-profile, commodity)-pairs whose excess demand 
is maximal. That is, (f, Si) E L" iff 
-nu(?, 6 )  - x ri(&, a) = max -nU(t, a) - x ri(ti, a)  
i G 1  ( t , a )  i G 1  
By passing through a subsequence if necessary, one may assume without loss 
of generality that 
LY = ~ " + 1  . . . =: LO. 
By the present hypothesis (7), 
This holds true, only if (qY,ay) as a point in the domain Q, x C of the 
correspondence !Ifu satisfies 
(otherwise, the cost - CtET qV(t) - nV(t) would be arbitrarily large, which 
contradicts the definition of nu as a cost-minimizer). Therefore, 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-05 
On the other hand, qu as a point in the response set Q"(qY,o;) assigns a 
greater weight than l / u  only to members of Lo. So 
which contradicts (8). 
Step 3. Since {n"), is bounded, and since 
ic I 
nY 5 0 for every i E I, 
the sequence {nr ), is also bounded for each i. By Assumption 2.6 (iv), (mr}, 
is bounded from above, and hence so is {mu),. Moreover, 
so {mu), is bounded from below as well. Therefore, {my), is also bounded. 
Since (xt;, yU) E C1(ljlV), {x;), is bounded. Thus, one may assume without 
loss of generality, 
Step 4. The plan (21, ijZ) is a member of Fz. To show this, one only needs 
to check 
For this purpose, choose any q in the relative interior of Q. Then, q E Q, for 
all v sufficiently large, so that 
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Letting v -+ CQ, 
This is true for all q in the relative interior of Q, hence it is also true for all 
q E Q. In particular, it is true for q = e6% Q defined by 
1, if (t,a) =(?,Zi), 
eifi ( t ,  a) := 0, otherwise. 
This means that 
- C nj(i, a) - C r i ( t 7  6) 5 0. 
if= I  iE I 
Since (6 6 )  was chosen arbitrarily, (9) is now established. 
Since 7; (:= (ui(qU, is in the core of game <yiC lor every v ,  and 
since as's are upper and lower semicontinuous, it follows that qI is in the 
core of game 
and 
By (lo), (21, P I )  E CI(CieI qi). Define a profit-imputation plan Zjl by: 
Then, 
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which is independent of t .  Moreover, for all t E T ,  
Therefore, (Zi,jjI) E GP. Define gi := E(Z: I 'I;). Then, fi ( t )  E $. By 
(11) no coalition S can improve upon yI) using strategies in Gp.  
Using Lemma 6.3 and Postulate 2.4, one can construct the required full- 
information revealing Bayesian incentive-compatible core plan from (Zi, yI), 
as in the last three paragraphs of the proof of Theorem 3.1. Q 
Proof of Theorem 5.2 is a straightforward consequence of the following 
Lemma 6.7 (applied to game VwiC) and the argument in the last three para- 
graphs of the proof of Theorem 3.1, so the details are left to  the reader. Let 
dV(I)  be the Pareto frontier of set V(I). Assumption (iii) of Lemma 6.7 
means that dV(I) is strictly negatively sloped. 
L E M M A  6.7 Let V : Z -+ R' be a non-side-payment game. Assume: 
(i) V is superadditive, i.e., for any disjoint coalitions Sl and S2 it follows 
that V(Sl) n V(S2) c V(Sl U $2). 
(ii) There exist a partition {I,, I,) of I, and g E R' such that i f  S 3 I,, then 
V(S) = [(gs} - Rs] x R'\'. 
(iii) For any E > 0 and any u E dV(I) for which u > g, there esist u' E V(I) 
and i E { j  E I I u; > gj}, such that u: = ui-E and US > u; for all j E I \ ( i ) .  
Choose any u* E dV(I) such that 
uf 1 % for all i E I,, and 
ut = II; for all i E I,. 
Then u* E C(V) 
Proof  Suppose there exists S E I such that u* E? (S). Then 
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Let u' E V(S) be such that 
u: > u: for all i 6i 5, 
u: = 2; for all i 6i I \ S (C I,). 
By the superadditivity, u' E X  V{I) .  By the strict negative-slopedness of 
dV(I),  there exists ut' E V(I) such that ut' >> u*, which contradicts the 
choice of u* as a point of dV(I). 
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